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This paper shows that geographical investor heterogeneity strongly influences sovereign 
risk. While standard sovereign debt models mainly attribute the absence of sovereign de-
faults to foreign creditor retaliation, a new theoretical literature argues that domestic credi-
tors also affect borrowing governments’ default decisions through channels of domestic 
politics. This paper examines this controversy using a newly assembled dataset on cross-
listed Scandinavian sovereign yields traded at markets that abruptly went from integration 
to segmentation by capital controls and World War II. The results strongly suggest that 
domestic and foreign bond investors assessed different sovereign risks whereas more stan-
dard explanations based on macroeconomic factors, portfolio choice or risk aversion 
added little explanatory value. The study also documents large effects on recorded asset 
prices from institutional trading constraints (e.g., price limits), an issue largely neglected 
by previous research in historical long-run asset returns. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper shows that investor heterogeneity across markets strongly influences sovereign 
risk assessments. Standard economic models of sovereign debt mainly focus on how the 
actions of foreign creditors influence the default decision of borrowing sovereigns through 
either increased reputational costs on international capital markets (e.g., Eaton and Gerso-
vitz, 1981; Wright, 2002) or trade sanctions launched by foreign creditor countries (e.g., 
Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Contrasting this one-sided geographical focus, a new theoreti-
cal literature points at the ability of domestic creditors in credibly threaten to punish the 
sovereign in case of a default on its domestic debt. For example, Drazen (1998) argues that 
since domestic creditors belong to the sovereign’s constituency they can punish the de-
faulting government by refusing reelection, evading taxation etc, which foreign creditors 
cannot do. This creates a gap in the expected default costs to the sovereign and hence a 
differential in its propensity to default on the domestic vs. the foreign debt. Other studies 
proposing a similar political-economic effect on sovereign risk from different investor 
populations are, e.g., Roubini (2001), Harms (2002); Brandauer (2003) and Di Gioacchino 
et al. (2004). 
 
Previous empirical research has largely focused on the traditional framework and hence 
the role of foreign debt and the results are not uniform. While some studies are mainly 
supportive (e.g., Tomz, 2001; Rose and Spiegel, 2003) others come to the conclusion that 
additional mechanisms are needed to fully understand the behavior of borrowing sover-
eigns (e.g., Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2004). Tomz (2004) is 
one of the few previous attempts to study the political-economic dimensions of domestic 
versus foreign sovereign risk. He analyzes large surveys of Argentine residents in the 
1980’s and early 2000’s finding that these are highly responsive to the distributional ef-
fects of a sovereign debt default and especially if foreigners fare better than themselves.  
 
This paper is a direct test of these issues drawing on a unique historical situation in Scan-
dinavia during World War II when capital controls abruptly segmented national bond 
markets that were previously fully integrated. While arbitrage and buybacks were ruled 
out the pricing of assets changed overnight from being “globally” to locally determined 
and in effect the regime switch offers a unique opportunity to test the effect of investor 
heterogeneity on sovereign risk according to the mechanisms of Drazen (1998) and others.   3
As a working hypothesis, if yields are significantly larger when markets are segmented 
than when they are integrated, controlling for other potential yield influences, this would 
signal that the new approach adds explanatory value to the traditional sovereign debt mod-
els.  
 
The basic dataset used consists of newly assembled secondary market yields of Danish 
long-term government bonds that were traded in Denmark and Sweden throughout the 
1930’s and 40’s. Sweden was the only Nordic country listing and trading foreign assets, 
which means that these data are uniquely allowing for comparative studies like this one. A 
complementary bond dataset and the relevant macroeconomic variables are also consid-
ered. The empirical analysis departs from a simple model of bond yields and a derivation 
of the variables driving cross-market yield spreads. Several contrasting hypotheses ex-
plaining yield spreads such as macroeconomic fluctuations, differences in portfolio choice 
or risk aversion are also examined. 
 
A special contribution of the paper is that it explicitly accounts for the considerable market 
regulations that were common in all Western Europe during World War II, and indeed also 
in Scandinavia and especially Denmark.
1 Luttmer (1996) and others have shown (on more 
modern data) that even moderate levels of trading frictions could significantly bias statisti-
cal inference on asset returns.
2 Despite this there are almost none of the past historical as-
set pricing studies that have tried to address this issue.
3 My paper hence not only presents 
new descriptive material on the Danish and Swedish bond market institutions and micro-
structure in the interwar and wartime period, but it also empirically analyzes their implica-
tions on recorded asset prices. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the most 
important Danish and Swedish bond market institutions and microstructure during the 
1930’s and 40’s. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology used and section 4 presents 
the data. In section 5, the results are presented and section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 Common frictions during WWII were price limits, trading halts, listing disruptions, special wartime trans-
action taxes and dividend restrictions. Denmark practiced all of these but Sweden only the last one. 
2 Examples of studies of price limits are Kim and Rhee (1997), Charemza and Majerowska (2000) and Evans 
and Mahoney (1997) and of short-sale constraints and margin requirements Jones and Lamont (2002). 
3 For example, Dimson et al. (2003) do not mention these issues at all while Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) 
simply omit the WWII period from the sample.    4
2  The Copenhagen and Stockholm bond markets around WWII 
Table 1 presents an overview of some of the most important characteristics of Danish and 
Swedish bond market institutions in the 1930’s and 40’s. In general, there is not much de-
tailed information about these markets why some of the descriptive statistics should be 
treated with caution. The Danish bond market had been well-developed for decades with a 
large number of issues both by the government and by several different non-government 
actors, especially credit and mortgage associations. The organized secondary market at the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange was accordingly relatively large, with more listed issues and 
larger trading volumes than the stock market.
4 In contrast, the Swedish bond market was 
smaller both in numbers of issues and traded volumes, at least this is true for the organized 
trading at the Stockholm Stock Exchange where bonds were regularly traded only in the 
late 1920’s. One thing that Stockholm but not Copenhagen did, however, was listing and 
trading a number of foreign bond loans, mainly issued in the 1920’s and 30’s by govern-
ments in the other Nordic and northern European countries.  
 
Information about the identity of traders and investors in both Denmark and Sweden is 
scarce. Some general descriptions of these markets indicate that holders of Danish gov-
ernment debt were both large financial institutions (central and commercial banks, insur-
ance companies etc) as well as private households. Perhaps most interesting is the identity 
of the marginal traders on both markets, and the most qualified guess would there be the 
ones working with institutional investors. 
 
It is also important to get a picture of the liquidity in the analyzed bonds as this concerns 
the reliability of the recorded market yields used. Unfortunately there are little disaggre-
gated data on bond trading, but the other evidence collected for this study allows for some 
tentative conclusions shown in Table 1.
5 The exchange recorded bond trading in Copenha-
gen and Stockholm was fairly continuous and significant throughout the period although 
Stockholm had both smaller volumes and almost no trading in Danish loans during 1940–
42. When also including the trading in the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, however, it 
seems like the exchange numbers vastly understate the total volumes underlying the 
quoted bond prices. Based on evidence from the mandatory Swedish transaction tax re-
                                                 
4 The sources are Statistical Yearbook of Denmark, table “Omsætningen af Værdipapirer ved den off. Noter-
ing paa Københavns Børs”, various years and the stock exchange lists published in Finanstidende. 
5 Data on Copenhagen trading is based on the daily data described below. For Stockholm I collected a sam-
ple of trading during one month each quarter, every second year during 1938–1948.   5
ceipts which enables estimates of the total bond trading in the economy and the relative 
shares of the OTC and the exchange, Table 1 indicates that the OTC volumes were be-
tween four and fifteen times larger.
6 Hence, the liquidity underlying the Swedish prices 
should be sufficient at least for our purposes. 
 
Market regulations developed radically during the period of investigation and after Sep-
tember 1939 most European financial markets experienced severe restrictions. The Co-
penhagen exchange was closed between September 1 and 11 by the Department of Com-
merce and when it reopened, new price limits prohibiting prices below two percentage 
points under the bid price of August 31 could were imposed. Two weeks later the limits 
were altered to prohibiting daily price falls beyond 1 percentage point, which was a regime 
that lasted until February 23, 1946 when all limits were removed.
7 On top of the initial 
trading halt, the Copenhagen exchange stopped its trading also after Germany invaded 
Denmark (between April and May 1940) and when the war ended (in May 1945). 
 
In Stockholm, by contrast, there were fewer regulatory changes related to the war. Trading 
continued and for pure neutrality reasons all bonds issued by foreign governments (includ-
ing German, Belgian and the Nordic countries) remained listed and traded without restric-
tions. The single important intervention occurred when price limits were imposed in late 
1939, launched by the Board of the Exchange. These limits were quite loose, however, 
allowing between five and ten times larger variations than the Copenhagen ones and some 
evidence suggests that they were never binding on Danish bond prices.
8  
 
One important regulatory change affecting both Denmark and Sweden was the capital con-
trols stopping cross-border investments from early 1940 onwards (see Table 1). The Dan-
ish controls came in January and April 1940 and the Swedish ones in February 1940.
9 
Both countries prohibited all transfers of currency, securities or capital goods unless they 
were approved by each country’s central bank. Figure 1 shows clearly how they stopped 
                                                 
6 The data for 1926 come from the Banking Inspection survey published in a government proposal Prop. 
1927:56 p. 13 and for 1948 (onwards) from the Banking Inspection recurrent official publication “Uppgifter 
om bankerna samt uppgifter om fondkommissionärerna och fondbörs”. 
7 On all these events, see the Danish financial weekly Finanstidende 6 Sep. 1939, p. 1020; 27 Sep. 1939, p. 
1077 and 27 Feb. 1946, p. 430. 
8 The official limit of maximum –5 percentage points per day was never strictly enforced and Algott (1963, 
pp. 182ff) argues that the Board allowed much larger price falls, up to 10 percentage points per day. The 
period when the limits were said to bind the most was December 1939 and then mainly for Finnish bonds. 
9 The Danish capital controls are described in Finanstidende 10 Apr. 1940, p. 589, and the Swedish ones in 
Valutakommittén (1980), SOU 1980:51, chapter 1.   6
all portfolio flows between the two countries from 1940 onwards. The spikes in 1936, 
1938 and 1947 reflect direct placements of Danish government loans. 
3  Estimation methodology 
This section develops tests to analyze the main questions of the study. The starting point is 
to characterize a nominal bond yield on market i as a function of the following determi-
nants:
10 a) the term premium T, which is the effect on the return by variation in time to 
maturity; b) the default risk DRi which in the standard view is borrower-specific and hence 
should have no subscript i, whereas Drazen (1998) and others suggest it to be dependent 
on geographical location and therefore have a subscript; c) market-specific institutional 
constraints θ such as taxes on cash flows, commission fees, market liquidity, price limits, 
trading halts etc. For example, minimum price limits tend to on average increase prices 
and decrease returns (see Charemza and Majerowska, 2000) whereas Silber (1991) and 
Longstaff (2004) show that illiquidity discounts may be substantial in cases of insignifi-
cant liquidity; d) macroeconomic conditions Ω such as inflation rates, market interest 
rates, the exchange rates (to account for international trading) and alternative investment 
opportunities as embodied in the market portfolio return. Altogether, the bond yield y at 
market i can be characterized as 
 
(1)   yi  =  y(DRi, T, θi, Ωi). 
 
The next step is to separate out the loan- and borrower specific yield determinants, which 
is done by subtracting the yield in market j from that in market i. This cancels out all loan- 
and borrower-specific factors shared across markets if y(·) is linear: 
 
(2)  yi – yj    =  y(DRi, T, θi, Ωi) – y(DRj, T, θj, Ωj) 
     =    y(DRi – DRj, θi – θj, Ωi – Ωj). 
 
Controlling for the macroeconomic and portfolio factors Ωi – Ωj makes the yield spread a 
function solely of the differences in default risk across markets DRi – DRj and in institu-
tional constraints θi – θj:  
 
                                                 
10 This setup is stylized but basically valid (see, e.g., Cuthbertson, 1996, ch. 9).   7
(3)   yi – yj |Ωi – Ωj   =  y(DRi – DRj, θi – θj) 
 
The challenge to empirically estimate equation (3) is to find appropriate variables that ac-
count for the macroeconomic and portfolio influences on yields. One way to do this goes 
through international macroeconomics and portfolio theory. For example, the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) asserts that nominal bond yields should be equal across countries 
once expected exchange rate changes are taken into account, which hence suggests a way 
to deal with the exchange rate effects across markets. In a similar way, the real interest 
rate parity (RIP) shows how expected inflation relates to yields, using the UIP and the 
relative purchasing power parity (PPP), which states that expected depreciation explains 
the difference in expected inflation. The RIP then shows that real yields should be equal 
across markets, at least in the “long run”. These concepts are admittedly stylized and theo-
retical, but they have been widely used to examine market integration and the behavior of 
long-run interest rate differentials and represent useful benchmarks for the clean macro-
economic influence on nominal and real sovereign yields (see, e.g., Jackson and Lothian, 
1993; Lothian, 2001).  
 
The following variables are used in the estimations. yitn is the nominal yield on Danish 
government bonds traded on market i (Copenhagen or Stockholm) in month t (in 1938:01–
1948:12) having n months left to maturity (descending from 252 to about 120); ritn = yitn – 
πit+n is the equivalent real yield when inflation expectation πit+n is subtracted from the 
nominal yield, and st is the log exchange rate defining number of units of Danish currency 
per unit of Swedish currency since the bonds were issued in local currencies. Depreciation 
expectations over n periods s
e
t+n are measured using the common technique (see, e.g., 
Jackson and Lothian) of ex post forward rate, st+n = s
e
t+n + ut, where st+n is the actual log 
exchange rate at period t + n and ut a random error (since expectations are assumed ra-
tional). Similarly, the expected inflation differentials across markets i and j in RIP are 




it+n) + εt, for random error εt. 
Another influence on bond yields is the interest-rate risk incorporating the cost of holding 
fixed-income securities when market interests fluctuate, measured as the market interest 




jt (for RIP) terms.  Fi-
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Estimating the impact of default risk and institutional constraints differences is mainly 
done through the use of time dummy variables in the UIP and RIP equations. The period is 
split to capture variation over time due to exogenous regulatory changes and historical 
events. Accordingly, the first dummy, C39:09–40:03, covers the initial war period when the 
circuit breakers were used but Denmark was still a neutral country. C40:04–43:08 is the initial 
period of the German occupation when Denmark was kept as a “protectorate” with consid-
erable political and economic autonomy.
11 C43:09–44:05 is the period when Germany imposed 
martial law and severely sharpened its control while C44:06–45:05 is the period with both 
martial laws and Allied victories at Normandy and elsewhere, one of the important turning 
points in the war. Finally, C45:06–46:02 is the only fully peaceful period when price limits 
were still in place. All other effects on yield differentials stemming from omitted institu-
tional differences (taxes on cash flows, market liquidity, commission fees etc) should enter 
the constants given that they did not change during the period. This in turn implies that the 
constants might well differ from zero despite the theoretical predictions of UIP and RIP.  
 
Adding up, the UIP equation based on nominal yield spreads yitn – yjtn to estimate is 
 
(4)  yitn – yjtn = β0 + β1(C39:09–40:03) + β2(C40:04–43:08) + β3(C43:09–44:05) + β4(C44:06–45:05) +  




jt) + ut, 
 
while the equivalent RIP equation based on real yield spreads ritn – rjtn is 
 
(5)  ritn – rjtn = γ0 + γ1(C39:09–40:03) + γ2(C40:04–43:08) + γ3(C43:09–44:05) + γ4(C44:06–45:05) +  








jt) + εt. 
 
Both equations will be estimated with OLS since the yield spreads are stationary by con-
struction. However, the overlapping observations in the ex post forward rates introduce 
serial correlation and therefore Newey and West (1987) standard errors are used. 
 
According to the theoretical equation (3) and the empirical representations (4) and (5), the 
parameters β1– β6 and γ1– γ6 do not disentangle the individual effects of sovereign risk and 
institutional differentials. To do this, I use complementary daily bond market data (de-
                                                 
11 For more details on the Danish economy and politics during the war, see Johansen (1986), ch. 5.    9
scribed in the data section below) to analyze the price limits effect in more detail and see 
whether they persist to the monthly level. If they were not, this will be taken as evidence 
in support of the sovereign risk explanation. 
 
One alternative explanation besides sovereign risk for high sovereign yield spreads is sug-
gested by Roubini (2000). He points at high risk aversion of foreign investors as the rea-
son for why recent emerging markets experience high spreads despite nearly default-free 
credit histories. I test this alternative hypothesis on the Scandinavian World War II case 
estimating variants of a single-asset time series CAPM, with both monthly sovereign 
yields and holding period returns as returns measure.
12 Although the Nordic markets were 
only partly integrated during this period, I control for potential cross-border diversification 
(as suggested by Karolyi and Stulz, 2003) by using two alternative portfolios: the local one 
and an equally-weighted “Nordic” portfolio based on the Copenhagen and Stockholm re-
turns converted into home currencies (i.e., everything in DKK when estimated for Danish 
investors and SEK for Swedish investors). The local and “Nordic” CAPM:s are then esti-
mated as follows,   
 
(6a)   zit = αik + z
L
it βik + νit,    k = Full, Prewar, War, Postwar, 
 
(6b)   zit = αik + z
N
it βik + νit,    k = Full, Prewar, War, Postwar, 
 









(i+j)/2,t – rfit the excess Nordic 
market return, αik constants and βik the beta for periods k = “Full” (1938:01–1948:12), 
“Prewar” (1938:01–1939:08), “War” (1939:09–1945:05) and “Postwar” (1945:06–
1948:12) and νit a random error.  
 
In all cases, I fit robust regressions since outlier influence is obvious and clearly indicated 
as both heteroskedasticity and non-normality of the residuals.
13 To account for the poten-
tial inference problems implied by the small sample sizes, I use bootstrapped standard er-
                                                 
12 Monthly holding period returns are included since they may be better to capture short-term variations rela-
tive to the fluctuations in the stock market portfolio. They are defined as ht = (Ct + Pt – Pt–1)/Pt–1, where Ct is 
the monthly accrued coupon interest and Pt the bond price at month t. Although zero-beta CAPM tests are 
not common for bonds and “Cuthbertson (1996, p. 248) discusses some previous attempts. 
13 Robust regressions (command rreg in STATA) basically eliminate gross outliers and then compute Huber-
biweight iterations in order to weight observations more evenly in the loss function.   10
rors (calculated with 2000 replications) for each sub-period. It should also be noted that 
single-asset CAPM regressions are inherently noisy, which means that the overall poor 
goodness of fit will be relatively low. 
4  Data 
The basic data are yields calculated from end-of-month bid prices at the Copenhagen and 
Stockholm Stock Exchanges during 1938–1948 collected from the Statistical Yearbook of 
Denmark (for Copenhagen) and the Swedish financial chronicle Affärsvärlden.
14 To get as 
similar Danish bonds as possible from each market, the 4% 25-year loan of 1934 from 
Copenhagen and the 4% 20-year loan of 1936 from Stockholm were selected (see figure 
2).
15 Both loans were semi-annual and both issued and paid coupons in local currencies. 
As noted by Statistics Denmark (1967, p. 226), the 1934 loan was prematurely redeemed 
in July 1950 but I have not found any indications or announcements of this in the financial 
chronicle Finanstidende in the years preceding the event and hence disregard this early 
call in the yield calculations. Available official documentation and financial press in both 
countries suggest that all bondholders, both home and abroad, received coupon payments 
throughout the period.
16 A complementary dataset with daily prices and volumes at Co-
penhagen were collected from the newspaper Berlingske Tidende for the shorter period 
7/1/39–6/30/40. The period was chosen for its many institutional changes but restricted in 
size due to time considerations. Three bonds were covered: the 1934 government bond 
described above and two 4% bonds issued by two regional credit associations: Copenha-
gen and Østifterne.
 17  
 
Data on market interest rate and also risk-free rates are measured as the central bank dis-
count rates (or inter-bank rate) of both countries. Market returns are measured as monthly 
stock market capital gains ((Pt – Pt–1)/Pt–1), collected from both countries’ statistical year-
books. These variables are all shown in Figure 3. Monthly spot exchange rates were col-
                                                 
14 For Denmark, see the table “Københavns Børskurs (Køber) for Obligationer”. For the period in April-May 
1940 when the exchange was closed but prices still quoted they were probably collected from the off-
exchange market arranged by the large brokerage firms, as discussed by Finanstidende 22 May 1940, p. 700. 
15 The results are robust to choice of yield concept (current yield and yield to average life were tried without 
affecting the basic results) and also bond loan (the Copenhagen-traded 3.5% consol of 1888 and Stockholm-
traded 3.5% 20-year loan of 1938 were used with no seeming effect). 
16 For Sweden, the Bond Catalogues of the Swedish Banker’s Association as well as Affärsvärlden were 
closely searched for any notes about halted or stopped debt service. Finanstidende 12 Jun. 1940, p. 761 actu-
ally explicitly reports how the Danish government sustained its debt service to foreign creditors. 
17 These two loans were selected as they were described as the most “popular” among Danish investors, and 
hence an upper bound on trading volumes. In the bond lists they were denoted as follows: Kjøbenhavns 
Kreditforening (1933–2007, 9 S.) and Østifternes Kreditforening (1934–2009, 14 S.)    11
lected from the Swedish central bank that posted daily offerings to buy and sell foreign 
currency. Inflation data is based on the cost of living indexes, CLI, published by Statistics 
Sweden and Statistics Denmark. A potential caveat in using the official price statistics is 
that both countries practiced price controls during the war and the resulting rationing 
might have made price unrepresentative. There is little previous research on these issues 
and the inflation proxies used here are the same as have been used in basically all previous 
studies of historical Nordic price levels. However, using nominal stock market returns im-
plies that the “real” underlying inflation should have been incorporated which means that 
at least in some estimations this problem is partly alleviated. Ex post forward rates of in-
flation are measured as πt+n = [(CLIt+n – CLIt)/CLIt]
12/n for n being the period (in number 
of months) over which the inflation is expected and the ratio in the exponent annualizes 
the inflation rate. CLI is the cost of living index collected from the each country’s Statisti-
cal Yearbooks and interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency using cubic splines. 
Many studies choose n = 12 to get a straightforward measure of annual inflation expecta-
tions, but since the bonds are assumed to be held until maturity date (as in “yield to matur-
ity”), n should be larger if the bonds are “long”-term. Here this means that for the period 
1938–1948 n descends from 252 (21 years) to 120 (10 years). To avoid selection prob-
lems, however, I use both n = 12 and n = [120,252] (see Figure 4). 
5  Econometric results 
In this section, the yield spreads are analyzed in two steps. First, the baseline models with 
nominal (UIP) and real (RIP) yield spreads are estimated, offering a first-pass estimate of 
how yields respond to either different risk assessments or trading constraints. Thereafter 
these two effects are traced out using the complementary data and specifications discussed 
above. 
5.1  The determinants of the yield spreads 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating equations (4) and (5). Basically all cases show 
time dummies C producing large and significantly negative estimates, regardless of 
whether inflation rates (both short- and long-term horizons), exchange rate fluctuations or 
differences in risk-free rates and market returns are included. Overall, this means that the 
period of segmentation implied highly distinct equilibrium yields in the two markets. 
 
In the initial war period, C39:09–40:03 is significantly negative but varies in size, possibly due 
to the large variances of some of the variables such as the yield spread, the short-horizon   12
inflation expectations and the risk-free rate in this sub-period. The three following periods 
C40:04–43:08 C43:09–44:05 and C44:06–45:05 also yield negative estimates at highly significant lev-
els. Interestingly enough, the size in the spread decrease over time from roughly –570 ba-
sis points (–5.7%) to –400 basis points and –290 basis point in each period, respectively. 
These magnitudes are remarkable and it should be noted that they persist regardless of in-
cluding the various control variables. Finally, for the brief postwar period when price lim-
its were still in place, C45:06–46:02 is significant and –100 basis points large in all cases ex-
cept for when short-horizon inflation rates are used. Although this could suggest an inde-
pendent price limit effect, one should not that capital controls remained in place after the 
war and the Danish fiscal uncertainty was potentially significant even after the German 
occupation ended. 
 
Expected depreciation enters negatively, which rejects UIP but goes in line with most pre-
vious studies of UIP over relatively short periods (Lothian and Liu, 2003). Interestingly, 
all regression intercepts are negative and, with a couple of exceptions, highly significant. 
This suggests that there are some additional institutional differences across the markets 
that influenced the yields above from the ones modeled. One such factor could be the 
mentioned liquidity gap in the Danish loans, i.e., that Danish loans in Stockholm were 
structurally less illiquid than in Copenhagen and that this induced an illiquidity discount. 
Moreover, transfers of foreign bonds were taxed in Stockholm with 0.15% which also 
could explain part of the difference. 
 
Finally, the difference in market interests enters positively as expected, but only in the real 
yield spread estimations. The market return differentials are insignificant throughout, pos-
sibly because of their relatively high variances as shown in Figure 3. 
5.2  Institutional constraints effects 
The complementary daily bond prices and volumes in Figures 5, 6 and 7 suggest that 
prices of all the three bonds fell 10%–15% from the war outbreak to April 1940 and then 
quickly recovered after the second trading halt in late May. If price limits would have been 
strictly binding, one would have expected prices to decrease stepwise 1% per day until 
they converged to the lower Stockholm prices (and with higher yields). This is not shown 
in the data. Hence, the daily observations suggest that the daily price limits did not influ-
ence yields on a monthly basis, hence they do not explain the results found previously.    13
 
The price limits could have affected trading volumes, however, in the form of crowding 
out to other markets or instruments as found by Evans and Mahoney (1997) for modern 
U.S. futures markets. Aggregate bond trading data from Statistics Denmark, however, 
show no decrease in trading on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange but instead large in-
creases in trading during the war. Indeed, volumes vanished under the initial price limit 
regime when a price floor regulated prices, but as soon as the limits changed to bound 
daily movements volumes returned gradually within a short period.
18 Testing for crowding 
out using statistical test for difference in average volumes between days when bid prices 
decreased less than 1% and when they decreased exactly 1% (i.e., when the limit was pre-
sumably binding), there is some evidence for crowding out as shown in Table 3. Since the 
bounds were only hit 20%–25% of the days when prices were falling, however, this still 
only suggests a weak effect. Interestingly, only non-governmental loans contain signifi-
cant volume differences, which indicate that whenever government bond prices were fal-
ling sharply supportive buying actions by large market actors were triggered. Qualitative 
sources confirm that the central bank (Nationalbanken) and large commercial banks 
openly intervened in the markets the government bonds in the market to keep its prices 
superficially high.
19 This kind of influence hence is another channel through which institu-
tional constraint affect the recorded yields. Altogether, however, the price limits had little 
long-run impact on yields in Copenhagen and were mainly binding on shorter terms in 
bear markets. 
5.3  Investor heterogeneity effects 
This section performs some additional tests of the investor heterogeneity explanation of 
the yield spreads. First I evaluate the suggestion by Roubini (2000) that high yield spreads 
may reflect high risk aversion of foreign investors. Then the overall robustness of the in-
vestor heterogeneity explanation is checked against the historical and contextual back-
ground.  
 
Testing the degree of risk aversion is performed by estimating single-asset time-series 
CAPM (equations (6a) and (6b)) using robust regressions to control for observed outlier 
                                                 
18 Contemporary sources confirms that crowding out was present during the first regime (see Finanstidende 
20 Sep. 1939, p. 1058; Obligationstidende 27 Sep. 1939) and that trading returns thereafter (Obligation-
stidende 5 Jun. 1940, p. 17). 
19 The Central Bank’s intervention is noted in early October Stated by the banking firm L. Palsby in “Fonds-
børsen og Krigen”, Berlingske Tidende, Jan. 1 1941, p. 8.   14
influences.
20 The estimated beta coefficients displayed in Table 4 give no indications of 
large differences in risk aversion between domestic and foreign investors, regardless of 
CAPM models or returns concepts used. In particular, there do not seem to be any consis-
tent variation in betas across time periods or countries although the Danish betas are sur-
prisingly often higher than the Swedish ones. As expected the models perform quite badly 
(especially when sovereign yields are used), why the results should be treated with some 
caution.  
 
Looking at the historical sources describing political and economic events in the region 
before and during the war, a clear correspondence between the investor heterogeneity hy-
pothesis and the historical evidence emerges. Prior to the war, the Danish government had 
a default-free track record (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989) and all Nordic investors antici-
pated the risk of a Danish sovereign default to be low, which produced insignificant yield 
spreads. When the war broke out, however, most Danish overseas trade routes and domes-
tic economic activities were severely disrupted (Johansen 1986, p. 72). The yield spreads 
also increased by 250 basis points (recall Table 2) during the initial war period, which re-
flects that the foreigners felt more concerned about a default when observing the economic 
and fiscal pressure of Denmark. Contemporary Danish financial magazines also describes 
how the residents kept track of the government’s public debt management, by expressing 
concerns over the inflationary pressure, governmentally induced or not.
21 When Germany 
occupied Denmark, a notorious defaulter-country took control which made yield spreads 
diverge dramatically. The historical descriptions in Johansen (1986, pp. 70ff) again sup-
port the investor heterogeneity explanation by the descriptions of Germany as a power that 
regarded it as important that Denmark functioned well economically and fiscally since this 
sustained the bilateral trade between the two countries (and probably also regarding future 
expropriation plans). The Danish residents did not experience a particular default threat, as 
reflected in the relatively low domestic yields, whereas Swedish creditors felt considerably 
more worried and seemed to have expected at least a partial default by the Germans.
22 
When Germany introduced martial law in late August 1943 the German goodwill towards 
the Danes became clearly less pronounced, which accordingly lowered yield spreads as 
Swedish yields remained high but Danish yields increased.
23 By the end of the war, Allied 
                                                 
20 The residuals in basic OLS regressions were both clearly heteroskedastic and non-normal. 
21 See, e.g., Finanstidende Mar. 13, 1940, pp. 484f. 
22 Affärsvärlden 4 May 1940, p. 396. 
23 On the fiscal policy changes around 1943, see Johansen (1986, p. 87).   15
war successes pointed at a German defeat and the decrease in risk assessments was on the 
margin most pronounced in Stockholm. Hence, despite that Germany was still formally in 
control, investors expected Denmark to be back on its default-free track as soon as the war 
ended.
24 This situation resembles the Soviet repudiation experiences on the Paris Bourse 
after World War I, where investors kept paying high prices for the repudiated Tsarist 
bonds since they believed in a coming political settlement and hence full reimbursement 
(see Oosterlinck and Szafarz, 2004). However, unlike in their case there were no signs of a 
Swedish bailout policy to rescue Swedish holders of Danish debt.
25 
6  Concluding remarks 
This paper empirically examines how sovereign risk depends on the location of trade and 
the nationality of investors as suggested by a recent strand in the sovereign debt literature. 
Unlike the standard of sovereign debt models that use foreign creditor retaliation to ex-
plain why borrowing countries deter from defaulting, the newer models emphasize that the 
political influence and punishment ability of domestic creditors also force sovereigns to 
reconsider default. The analysis rests on a unique historical episode in Scandinavian bond 
markets, when World War II implied that the previously integrated markets became 
abruptly segmented by capital controls and war. Despite this, the interwar debt listed 
across border remained traded throughout the 1930’s and 40’s, allowing for direct investi-
gations of the impact of investor heterogeneity on sovereign risk.  
 
Several important findings come out of the analysis. The main result is that geographical 
differences in default risk expectations are important determinants of observed yield 
spreads across markets whereas changes in macroeconomic factors, portfolio choice or 
risk aversion have only marginal influence. This finding lends support the recent theoreti-
cal studies by Drazen (1998), Di Gioacchino et al. (2004) and others emphasizing that 
sovereigns strategically default at home and/or abroad based on the total political and eco-
nomic costs this involves and that market actors simultaneously anticipate this decision 
process. 
 
                                                 
24 In early 1944 the Danish creditworthiness was firmly acknowledged with reference to the “happy and 
complete restoration after the currently burdensome situation” (Affärsvärlden 9 Mar 1944, p. 191). See also 
the article “Denmark after the Occupation” from 14 Sep 1944, p. 9. 
25 In contrast, an article in one of the Swedish financial quarterly reviews stated the poor payoffs of foreign 
investments of Swedish investors in the 1930’s and 40’s were bygones (“Värdepappersmarknaden under 
kriget”, Skandinaviska Bankens Kvartalstidskrift, January 1946, pp. 25f.)   16
Another contribution of the study is that it conducts one of the first systematic analyses of 
the effect on asset pricing from the profound institutional trading constraints that almost 
every Western government imposed on financial markets during World War II. In particu-
lar, it is found that despite the restrictiveness of the Copenhagen price limits their effect on 
long-run market yields was limited. However, signs of instantaneous price distortions and 
crowding out of trading activities were found, which is also what studies of more recent 
trading circuits experiences have observed. 
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Table 1: Danish and Swedish bond market microstructure around World War II  
  Copenhagen/Denmark Stockholm/Sweden 
Bond market features:    
Main organized market  Copenhagen Stock Exchange  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
Number and types of 
bonds listed 
≈250 bonds, 20 governmental. All 
domestic and DKK-denominated. 
≈60 bonds, 15 governmental, 10 for-
eign. All SEK-denominated. 
Reporting frequency  Daily  Biweekly (domestic), weekly (foreign) 
Monthly average trading 
volumes on exchange, 
1938–1948. 
All bonds: 470 million DKK 
All stocks: 62 million DKK 
Danish government bond in the 
study: 0.14 million DKK (≈ 0.03% 
of total bond trading) 
All bonds: 164 million SEK 
All stocks: 205 million SEK 
Danish government bond in the study: 
0.04 million SEK (≈ 0.02% of total 
bond trading) 
Estimated total bond trad-
ing (OTC + exchange) 
n.a.  Jan.-Jun. 1926: 179.1 million SEK, 
with OTC 134.1 (75%) and exchange 
45 (25%). 
1948: 1,714 million SEK, with OTC 
1,356 (79%) and exchange 358 (21%).
1949–1952 (average): 7,421.1 million 
SEK, with OTC 6,934.4 (93%) and ex-
change 486.7 (7%). 
Rules and regulations:    
Price limits  1. 9/1/39–9/22/39: Min. 2% below 
prices of 8/31/39. 
2. 9/23/39–2/23/46: ≥-1% per day. 
9/1/39–1/2/40: ≥-5% (–10%) per day. 
Trading halts  1. 9/1/39–9/11/39 
2. 4/9/40–5/27/40 
3. 5/8/45–5/18/45 
No trading halts. 
Capital controls  Currency transfers restricted from 
Jan. 1940. Capital in- and outflows 
stopped from Apr. 1940. 
All capital and currency in- and out-
flows without approval of the Bank of 
Sweden stopped from Feb. 1940. 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 2: Explaining the yield differentials across markets, 1938–1948. 
Equation:  (4) (4) (4) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
Spreads:  nominal  nominal  nominal  real real real real real real 
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(0.018) 
   0.025 
(0.027) 


















n,  inflation        12  12  12  (120,252) (120,252) (120,252)
#  obs.  132 132 129 132 132 129 132 132 129 
F-statistic 93.6 61.2 96.6  343.3 551.45 563.4  68.0  69.9.5 134.5 
R
2  0.77 0.79 0.88 0.34 0.90 0.96 0.72 0.73 0.87 
Note: Dependent variables are nominal yield spreads yCop,t – ySto,t as in equation (4) and real yield spreads 
rCop,t – rSto,t as in equation real of Danish government bonds across the Copenhagen and Stockholm Stock 
Exchanges. C denote time dummies explained in the text. st+n – st is the ex post depreciation between the 
Danish and Swedish currencies, where s = DKK/SEK. rfCop,t – rfSto,t and rf
real
Cop,t  – rf
real
Sto,t are the nominal 






Cop,t  – R
m,real
Sto,t the 
same for stock market returns. n is inflation horizon 12 (annual) or 120–252 (10–21 years). ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-levels, respectively. Newey and West (1987) het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors with maximum 6 lags stand in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Mean differences in daily trading volume in three bonds traded at the Co-
penhagen Stock Exchange between July 1939 and June 1940.   
  Trading volume (DKK 1000’s) at 
days when prices changed... 
  
  0% < ∆P < –1%  ∆P ≤ –1%  Mean difference  H0: Mean diff. > 0
Government 4% loan of 
1934 
      
Mean 11.33  5.20  6.13  t-stat: 1.27 
Standard error  (3.74)  (3.04)  (4.82)  Pr. > t: 0.105   
Observations 42  10     
        
Copenhagen Credit Asso-
ciation 4% loan of 1933 
      
Mean 34.32  9.50  24.82**  t-stat: 1.74 
Standard error  (14.02)  (2.73)  (14.29)  Pr. > t: 0.044   
Observations 57  16     
        
Østifternes Credit Associa-
tion 4% loan of 1934 
      
Mean 18.41  8.86  9.56***  t-stat: 2.41 
Standard error  (2.79)  (2.82)  (3.97)  Pr. > t: 0.010   
Observations 63  14     
Notes and sources: The bonds and their sources are described in the text. One extreme outlier observation of 
the Copenhagen Credit Association sample has been removed (abnormally large trading on June 5 when bid 
prices dropped 1% but trading was done at higher prices). The t-tests assume unequal variances according to 
Welch’s approximation technique. 
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Table 4: Robust Local and Nordic CAPM:s with Bootstrapped Standard Errors. 
   Sovereign yields  Holding period returns   
Market (i),  
Period (k)  CAPM  ˆik α   ˆ
ik β   Pr.>F  ˆik α   ˆ
ik β   Pr.>F #  obs.
k = Full  
(1/1938–12/1948) 
             
   i = Copenhagen  Local   0.001*** 
(0.000) 
   0.024***
(0.008) 
0.004    0.001**
(0.000) 
  0.082*** 
(0.022) 
0.000 129 






  0.074*** 
(0.021) 
0.001 129 


















k = Prewar  
(1/1938–8/1939) 
             




































k = War  
(9/1939–5/1945) 
             






  0.086*** 
(0.036) 
0.016 66 



























k = Postwar 
(6/1945–12/1948) 
             




































Note: Huber-Biweight robust CAPM regressions (6a) and (6b) with bootstrapped standard errors (with 2000 
replications) for all sub-periods. Dependent variable is excess return (either sovereign yields or holding pe-
riod returns) on Danish sovereign debt over the risk-free rate. “Local” and “Nordic” CAPM refer to the use 
of either a local portfolio or an equally-weighted Copenhagen-Stockholm portfolio. Subscript i is market 
place and k is periods “Full”, “Prewar”, “War” and “Postwar”. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%-
, 5%- and 1%-levels, respectively.  
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Swedish capital to Denmark Danish capital to Sweden 
 
Source: The Swedish Banking inspection: “Bankbolags och vissa fondmäklares värdepappersaffärer med 

































Sources: See text. 
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1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948
Rm,Cop Rm,Sto rf,Cop rf,Sto
 
Notes: Rm,Cop and Rm,Sto are capital gains on the composite stock market indexes in Copenhagen and 
Stockholm, respectively. rf,Cop and rf,Sto are discount rates of the respective central banks. 
Sources: See text. 
 
 

























































Danish inflation (n=12) Swedish inflation (n>119)
Danish inflation (n>119) Swedish inflation (n=12)
Exchange rate
 
Sources: See text.  25
























































End of first price 
limit regime
 
Source: Daily market reports in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende. 
 






















































460x2 320 740 492,684





Source: Daily market reports in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende. 
 





















































e Trading halt 2
Trading halt 1
End of first price 
limit regime
 
Source: Daily market reports in the newspaper Berlingske Tidende. 
 
 